There is an interesting post here on Xena’s blog.
I don’t centre “proof” in mathematics to anywhere near the extent that Kevin does, but I think emphasizing that distinction obscures the fact that our opinions about mathematics, mathematicians, and, I suspect, AI are quite similar.
It is fascinating to observe the progress of AI in mathematics (other people might use different adjectives). The result that a finite group scheme of order \(n\) need not be annihilated by \(n\) is the first AI-assisted result that I actually “care about.” I most closely associate this problem with a remark Hendrik Lenstra (the human equivalent of an LLM in the 90s) once made to me in the elevators of Evans Hall: namely, that there is a weaker result asserting that every finite flat group scheme \(G\) of order \(n\) is annihilated by \(n^{c(n)}\), for some integer \(c(n)\) independent of \(G\). The point is that there is, in an appropriate sense, a universal family of group schemes of order \(n\) over a finite-type base \(S\), where \(S\) is more or less the parameter space required to write down all the necessary Hopf-algebra data.
I absolutely agree with Kevin’s reaction to reading LLM-generated mathematics. Reading mathematics is already extremely hard; we are used to the fact that we might have to spend weeks understanding a few lines in a difficult paper. But what gives us the spirit to persevere is that we have been trained to give the author the benefit of the doubt: it is we who are missing the idea, and if only we think a little more about it, we will work it out. For better or worse, this is a cultural truth of mathematics. Once that is taken away (and it absolutely should be, for now, when reading LLM-generated mathematics) it becomes almost impossible to read mathematics. If there is one thing that LLMs have mastered, it is writing with the confidence and airs of someone possessing great authority.
Low-Hanging Fruit:
Some people have dismissed the recent AI-assisted breakthroughs because they were “obvious in retrospect” or because “not enough people tried to do them.” The first criticism seems clearly ridiculous, since “obvious in retrospect” is very far from “obvious.”
The second criticism reflects, in part, the way humans solve conjectures. In my experience, the process goes as follows. First, you learn about the conjecture and why it might be interesting. Second, you learn a little about why it is hard. You might think about it for a while and fail, and then file it away in the back of your mind. Later, when you encounter new ideas, you perform some pattern recognition and ask whether those ideas have any relation to previous problems you care about. If you are lucky, you “see a connection,” and then you can begin. Sometimes the first inspirational connection is most of the work; sometimes it is only the beginning, and there is much more work to do. In either case, that initial step is crucial.
An LLM, on the other hand (to anthropomorphize), can conduct an extremely thorough literature search and then throw a thousand different ideas at the problem to see whether anything sticks. If one of those ideas does seem relevant, and if the journey from that realization to the end of the proof is not a long one, then the LLM can solve the entire problem. As it becomes possible to chain together longer and longer stretches of reasoning, the only problems that can resist attack are those requiring a genuinely new idea (whatever that means).
Finally, there is the observation that these results are all counterexamples to conjectures that, as far as I know, were generally regarded as true. This phenomenon has a clear diagnosis, given by Deligne: “All problems in mathematics are psychological.” Well, to be precise, that quote was ascribed to Deligne* by Kisin in a lecture at Luminy, but it captures the essence of something clearly true. And the good news is that AI is an insane psychofreak with no hangups.
Addressing the more interesting—and controversial—question of what we, as a profession, are to do about all of this will have to wait until later. This week, I will be attending my first ICM in person. It is a much-maligned conference whose most exciting moment has already been blown by incompetent website design and which is being held in a city with slightly less appeal to me personally than St. Petersburg; but we shall see!
* Since I always check the original source, here is a slightly more nuanced version of that quote:
Dear Calegari,
I don’t remember the exact words, but I expect it is roughly accurate. Of course, it is not always true. The meaning was that we often have blocks which prevent us from seeing things which later will seem obvious to us.
Best,
Pierre Deligne
Not all AI-assisted breakthroughs have been counterexamples to conjectures generally regarded as true. This might be true for all AI-assisted breakthroughs in algebraic geometry, but outside algebraic geometry there have been proofs of conjectures that were generally regarded as true that are universal statements (i.e. the kind that can be disproved with a counterexample, not proved with an example) and that had seen significant work by mathematicians previously. The cycle double cover conjecture and the asymptotic form of Erdős’s primitive set conjecture are two examples that come to mind. (For the primitive set conjecture another psychological block was in play: The first method anyone tried on the question was successful enough that future work was devoted to refinements and variants of this method, when really another method was needed. The cycle double conjecture is more mysterious to me.)
The fact that these exist in some fields of mathematics and not in algebraic geometry, or the Langlands program or transcendence theory, seems to me to most likely be a matter of time: time for AI models to improve and time for mathematicians in these fields to pick them up and use them on their problems.
In case it’s not clear, I certainly agree with the second comment. I also think it will be very hard to predict what problems will be “easier” than others as technology evolves.
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